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SECTION!
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
This Flight Safety Plan presents flight safety requirements, restrictions, and instru-
mentation necessary for each launch. The plan defines flight safety responsibilities
of the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
The requirements for flight termination and propellant dispersion are described, and
the restrictions and instrumentation applicable for each Apollo/Saturn V flight are
l istedo
1.2 AUTHORITY
The Flight Safety Plan is authorized within KSC by the Apollo Test Requirements
Document, M-D MA 1400, dated May 20, 1964.
1.3 SCOPE
This plan is applicable during the launch countdown and powered flight of the vehicle
up to orbit insertion.
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SECTION II
FLIGHT SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1 AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE
The Webb-McNamara agreement of January 17, 1963, supplemented by the AFMTC/
LOC agreements of June 5, 1963, places the responsibility for flight safety of all
launches from the AFETR and KSC on the Commander of the AFETR. This responsi-
bility includes specifying flight termination system requirements, protecting life and
property from an errant vehicle (except within KSC), establishing data requirements
and flight safety instrumentation requirements, etc.
2.2 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
By the same agreements cited in paragraph 2.1, the Director, KSC, is responsible
for the protection of life and property within KSC from an errant vehicle launched or
intended to be launched from Cape Kennedy or KSC. This responsibility includes
designating launch danger areas within KSC, clearing these areas during danger periods,
etc. Also included is the responsibility for Crew Safety on manned launches from KSC.
This responsibility does not include Range Safety Flight Termination control of the
vehicle after lift-off, which is the sole responsibility of the Commander of the AFETR.
To that extent, the protection of life and property within KSC is a joint effort of KSC
and AFETR.
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Figure 3-1. Saturn V Propellant Dispersion Ordnance Locations
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SECTION III
FLIGHT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
3.1 FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEMS
All ballistic or space booster vehicles launched at the AFETR must contain two indepen-
dent flight termination systems which are compatible with the AFETR ground system. The
two systems must be installed on the last powered stage and must be capable of destroying
all powered stages of the vehicles. For stages that go into orbit prior to ignition, a com-
mand system is not required. However, the stage must be capable of being destroyed by
command from the preceding stage and also must contain an automatic flight termination
system. All stages that do not contain a command system must contain an automatic flight
termination system. The automatic flight termination system destroys the thrust capability
of the stage in the event of premature separation or breakoff from the other stages carrying
a flight termination system. The termination system is automatically activated by mechanical
means when premature separation or breakoff occurs. The manned portion of a space vehicle
will not require a destruct system on manned flights. Propulsive systems that are not con-
sidered as a stage of a vehicle (retrorocketsi escape rockets, payloads, etc.) and which
present radiological, toxicological, or explosive hazards will require an automatic flight
termination system if they have the capability of violating the launch area or flight safety
lines. For liquid-propelled vehicles, flight termination action must cause engine shut-
down and fuel dispersion or intermixing, depending upon the nature of the propellants.
The Apollo/Saturn V carries two independent flight termination and propellant dispersion
systems in each active booster stage. There is no destruct system associated with the
Apollo spacecraft. Figures 3-1 through 3-4 pictorially display the Apollo/Saturn V
flight termination/propellant dispersion system.
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Figure 3-2. S-IC Stage Propellant Dispersion System, Block Diagram
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SECTION IV
FLIGHT SAFETY RESTRICTIONS
4,1 PRFRFnFNr.F
The information contained in this section is disseminated several months before launch
and is subject to change at any time. In event of conflict between the Flight Safety Plan
and the Apollo Mission Rules published for each launch, the Mission Rules shall
be considered the official source for procedures or requirements. (The Mission Rules
are constantly subject to revision/updating.)
4.2 WEATHER RESTRICTIONS
4.2.1 CEILING. A minimum ceiling height is imposed on all launches. The height
of the ceiling is determined by the time required for the launch area radars to acquire the
vehicle after lift-off. If the Cape Kennedy FPS-16 radar and the KSC TPQ-18 radar
are committed for "beam intercept" at a specific time after lift-off, the minimum ceiling
for AS-501 will be zero. "Beam intercept" requires each radar to be looking at a point
in space where the vehicle will be at a specific time after lift-off. The radars acquire and
lock onto the vehicle as it passes through these areas. If the radars are not operational,
or precipitation between the radar sites and the pads makes "beam intercept" impossible
at launch, the minimum ceiling for AS-501 will be 2,000 feet.
4.2.2 VISIBILITY. A minimum visibility limit is imposed on all launches. The
visibility limit is usually determined by the vertical wire skyscreen site selected for the
launch. If the "beam intercept" method of radar acquisition is used for AS-501, the
visibility limit will be zero; otherwise, the visibility will be 5 miles.
4.2.3 WINDS. A wind restriction is usually imposed on the launch if the vehicle remains
over Cape Kennedy for any length of time. This restriction prevents pieces of a destructed
vehicle from drifting into protected areas. The wind restriction for AS-501 is a 1.25 a
annual wind profile blowing from 65 degrees east of north (figure 4-1) and applicable to
an altitude of 30 kilometers. In the event this profile is violated by prevailing wind
conditions during countdown, the Range Safety Division performs a computer-simulated
flight, terminating thrust and breaking the vehicle into pieces at each interval, with the
prevailing winds acting on them to determine if the pieces can fall outside the impact limit
Iines.
4.3 OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS
4.3.1 LAUNCH VEHICLE. A restriction has been placed on the booster concerning
engine cutoff resulting from an abort action. An airborne timer will be flown in the
booster that will prevent, for a stipulated period of time, booster engine cutoff except by
range safety command. For vehicle AS-501, the timer will be set to allow booster engine
cutoff by an abort command from T+30 seconds on.
4.3.1.1 Command Receiversl Two operational command receivers on the S-IC, S-II, and
S-IVB stages are mandatory for launch.
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4.3.2 SPACECRAFT. None
4.3.3 CREWSAFETY. None
4..3.4 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. Otheragreementsand/or restrictions that have
a bearingon the overall flight safety area are given in the following paragraphs:
a. To allow successful abort of the commandmoduleduring the S-IC flight, a
time delay will be imposedbetweenthe commands"cutoff" and "destruct." This interval
is governedby a timeron the RangeSafety Officer's (RSO) console. For vehicle
AS-501, the timerwill be set for 2.0 seconds.
b. After normallaunchescape system(LES) tower jettison in the early portion
of the S-II flight, the RSOwill not normally send "destruct" if RangeSafety action is
taken. If Manual Fuel Cutoff (MFCO) doesnot establish an Impact Predictor (IP),
the RSOwill verbally request the Flight DynamicsOfficer (FIDO) to send "ABORT"
followed by "SPS off." The RSOmayelect to send "DESTRUCT" if the above
proceduresfail to terminatethrust.
c. The RSOwill send "MFCO" and will request "SPS off" from Mission
Control Center, Houston(MCCH)wheneverrangesafetyaction is required. The "SPS off reset"
commandwill not betransmitted after any rangesafety action.
d. The BermudaRSOwill safe the S-IVB destruct system at the first opportunity
after the first S-IVB burn.
e. Communicationsbetweenthe Flight DynamicsOfficer (MCCH), the Cape
KennedyRSO, andthe BermudaRSOare mandatory.
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Figure 4-1. 1.25 o Annual Wind Profile from 65 Degrees Azimuth
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SECTION V
FLIGHT SAFETY INSTRUMENTATION
5.1 SAFETY DATA SOURCES
The AFETR requires that at least two different, adequate sources of safety data for
each phase of powered flight be operational at launch. An "adequate" source is defined
as one which can protect the applicable impact limit line without endangering a normal
missile. The RSO will ensure that the adequate data source requirement is met and
that those requirements designated "critical" are provided before giving a launch
clearence. Those items designated "critical" for AS-5Olare:
a. Impact Predictor
b. Bermuda Command Control Transmitter
c. Bermuda FPS-16, Bermuda FPQ-6,
Grand Turk FPQ-18 (2 of 3)
d. Spacecraft C-Band Beacon or IU C-Band Beacons
Instrumentation avai lable during S-IC stage powered flight are:
a. High Resolution Trackers (HRT) 1 & 2
b. KSC TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (19.18)
c. Patrick AFB TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (0.18)
d. G lotract Station I
e. Program and Flightline Electronic Sky Screen Equipment (ELSSE)
f. Cape FPS-16 C-Band Radar (1.16)
g. Offset Doppler(ODOP)
h. GBI TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (3.18)
Instrumentation avai lable during S-ll stage powered flight are:
a. Cape FPS-16 C-Band Radar (1.16)
b. MILA TPQ-18 C-Band Radar(19.18)
c. Patrick AFB TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (0.18)
d. GBI TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (.3.18)
e. Grand Turk TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (7.18)
f. Bermuda FPS-16 C-Band Radar
g. Bermuda FPQ-6 C-Band Radar
h. Flightline ELSSE
i. Glotrack Station I
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Instrumentationavailable during S-IVB stagepoweredflight are:
a. Grand Turk TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (7.18)
b. Bermuda FPS-16 C-Band Radar
c. Bermuda FPQ-6 C-Band Radar
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